In standard political economy models, voters are 'self-interested'i.e. care only about 'own' utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often have 'other-regarding preferences'(ORP), i.e., in deciding among alternative policies voters care about their payo¤s relative to others. We extend a widely used general equilibrium framework in political economy to allow for voters with ORP, as in FehrSchmidt (1999). In line with the evidence, these preferences allow voters to exhibit 'envy' and 'altruism', in addition to the standard concern for 'own utility'. We give su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have ORP. This could open the way for an incorporation of ORP in a variety of political economy models. Furthermore, as a corollary, we give more general conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have purely sel…sh preferences.
Introduction
The median voter theorem has been seminal to the development of modern political economy. The standard model relies on voters being self-interested. The main expository framework for this work relies on Romer (1975) , Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) (or the RRMR framework) which is a simple general equilibrium model with endogenous labor supply.
Despite the standard assumption of self-interested voters, it seems very plausible that explanations for redistribution should be underpinned by the inherent human desire to care directly for the well being of others. In other words, in the domain of redistribution, it seems reasonable to postulate that individuals have other regarding preferences (or ORP for short). An emerging empirical literature is strongly supportive of the role of ORP speci…cally in the domain of voting models; see, for instance, Ackert et al. (2007) , Bolton and Ockenfels (2006) and Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) . These papers establish that voters often choose policies that promote equity/fairness over purely sel…sh considerations. Bolton and Ockenfels (2006) , for instance, examine the preference for equity versus e¢ ciency in a voting game. Groups of three subjects are formed and are presented with two alternative policies: one that promotes equity while the other promotes e¢ ciency. The …nal outcome is chosen by a majority vote. About twice as many experimental subjects preferred equity as compared to e¢ ciency. Furthermore, even those willing to change the status-quo for e¢ ciency are willing to pay, on average, less than half relative to those who wish to alter the status-quo for equity.
An important question is the following. Does a Condorcet winner exist in a model with ORP? The lack of a satisfactory answer is likely to hold up progress within the class of political economy models that seek to incorporate the important insights from the literature on ORP. The current situation is analogous to the period of time before the median voter theorem was discovered by Duncan Black (1948) ( and later popularized by Anthony Downs, 1957) for the case of self-interested voters. However, once known, and popularized, the median voter theorem opened up the domain of modern political economy as we know it today. The aim of our paper is to provide su¢ cient conditions under which a Condorcet winner exists when voters have ORP in a RRMR framework.
There are several models of fairness in the literature. We choose to use the FehrSchmidt (1999) (henceforth, FS) approach to fairness 1 . In this approach, voters care, 1 Bolton and Ockenfels (2002) provide yet another approach of inequity averse economic agents (referred to as 'ERC', short for equity, reciprocity and cooperation), but it cannot explain the outcome of the public good game with punishment, which is a fairly robust experimental …nding. Charness and Rabin (2002) provide two successive versions of their model. In the …rst version, economic agents do not care directly about outcome di¤erences or the role of 'intentions'. This model is unable to explain the results of the public good game with punishment. A second version of the model introduces the role of intentions.
1 not only about their own payo¤s, but also about their payo¤s relative to those of others. If their payo¤ is greater than other voters then they su¤er from advantageous-inequity (arising from, say, altruism) and if their payo¤ is lower than other voters they su¤er from disadvantageous-inequity (arising from, say, envy). Several reasons motivate our choice of the FS model.
1. The FS model is tractable and explains the experimental results arising from several games where the prediction of the standard game theory model with sel…sh agents yields results that are not consistent with the experimental evidence. These games include the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, the dictator game as well as the public-good game with punishment 2 .
2. The FS model focusses on the role of inequity aversion. However, a possible objection is that it ignores the role played by 'intentions'that have been shown to be important in experimental results (Falk et al. (2002) ) and treated explicitly in theoretical work (Rabin (1993) , Falk and Fischbacher (2006) Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) . 2 In the …rst three of these games, experimental subjects o¤er more to the other party relative to the predictions of the Nash outcome with sel…sh preferences. In the public good game with punishment, the possibility of ex-post punishment dramatically reduces the extent of free riding in voluntary giving towards a public good. In the standard theory with sel…sh agents, bygones are bygones, so there is no ex-post incentive for the contributors to punish the free-riders. Foreseeing this outcome, free riders are not deterred, which is in disagreement with the evidence. Such behavior can be easily explained within the FS framework. taxes that reduce advantageous or disadvantageous inequity. In the context of voting experiments, Bolton and Ockenfels (2006) conclude that "...while not everyone measures fairness the same way, the simple measures o¤ered by ERC or FS provide a pretty good approximation to population behavior over a wide range of scenarios that economists care about."
It is worth noting that when the labor supply decision is endogenous, the median-voter theorem with sel…sh voters is known to hold only in special cases. Actual (and successful) applications largely use quasi-linear preferences with quadratic-disutility of labour e¤ort. This forms the basis of Meltzer and Richard's (1981) celebrated result that the extent of redistribution varies directly with the ratio of the mean to median income. Piketty (1995) restricts preferences to the quasi-linear case with quadratic-disutility of labour. Benabou (2000) considers the additively-separable case with log-consumption and disutility of labor given by a constant-elasticity form. This brings us to our second contribution in the paper. For the special case of sel…sh voters, we establish the existence of a Condorcet winner for a more general class of utility functions as compared to the existing literature.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formulates the model. Section 3 establishes the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have other regarding preferences. For the special case of purely self interested preferences we establish the existence of a Condorcet winner for a more general class of utility functions relative to the existing literature. Section 4 provides an illustration and checks that our assumptions are satis…ed in the quasi-linear case with constant elasticity of labour supply, which forms the basis of much research in the literature.
Model
We consider a general equilibrium model as in Meltzer and Richard (1981) . Let there be n = 2m 1 voter-worker-consumers (henceforth, voters). Let the skill level of voter j be s j , j = 1; 2; :::; n, where
Denote the skill vector by s = (s 1 ; s 2 ; :::; s n ) and the median skill level by s m . Each voter has a …xed time endowment of one unit and supplies l j units of labor and so enjoys L j = 1 l j units of leisure, where
Labour markets are competitive and each …rm has access to a linear production technology such that production equals s j l j . Hence, the wage rate o¤ered to each voter coincides with the marginal product, i.e., the skill level, s j . Thus, the before-tax income of voter j is given by
Note that 'skill'here need not represent any intrinsic talent, just ability to translate labour e¤ort into income 3 . Let the average before-tax income be
The government operates a linear progressive income tax that is characterized by a constant marginal tax rate, t, t 2 [0; 1], and a uniform transfer, b, to each voter that equals the average tax proceeds,
The budget constraint of voter j is given by
In view of (2.3), the budget constraint (2.6) can be written as
Preferences of Voters
We de…ne a voter's preferences in two stages. First, let voter j have a concave ownutility function, e u(c j ; 1 l j ), de…ned over own-consumption, c j , and own-leisure, 1 l j . In common with the literature, we assume that all voters have the same own-utility function. Hence, voters di¤er only in that they are endowed with di¤erent skill levels, s j . We assume that the utility function has the following, plausible, properties. It is thrice continuously di¤erentiable and
From (2.8a), the marginal utility of consumption is positive, while (2.8b) implies that marginal utility of leisure is positive, unless l = 0 in which case (2.8c) says that the consumer is satiated with leisure. From (2.8d), when a consumer has no leisure, she always (weakly) prefers one extra unit of leisure to one extra unit of consumption. (2.9a)
says that marginal utility of consumption is non-increasing. Consumption and leisure are complements (2.9b) while (2.9c) implies that the marginal utility of leisure is strictly declining unless, possibly, the consumer is satiated with leisure (in which case e u 22 (c; 1) = 0). Conditions (2.8) and (2.9a-c) guarantee that a maximum exists, that it is unique and that it is an interior point (0 < l i < 1); unless t = 1 in which case the maximum will lie at l i = 0. Conditions (2.9a,c,d) guarantee that e u is concave. Since @ e u @c j > 0, (2.8a), it follows that the budget constraint (2.7) holds with equality. Substituting c j = (1 t) s j l j + b, from (2.7), into the own-utility function, e u(c j ; 1 l j ), gives the following form for own-utility
Second, and for the reasons stated in the introduction, voters have other-regarding preferences as in Fehr-Schmidt (1999) . Under Fehr-Schmidt preferences the FS-utility of voter j, U j (l j ; l j ; t; b; s), is as follows. Let l j be the vector of labour supplies of voters other than voter j. Then
where u j is de…ned in (2.10) and
for fair voters 0 < < 1; < , so U j (l j ; l j ; t; b; s) 6 = u (l j ; t; b; s j ) . (2.13)
Thus, u is also the utility function of a sel…sh voter, as in the standard textbook model. From (2.11), the fair voter cares about own-utility (…rst term), utility relative to those where inequality is disadvantageous (second term) and utility relative to those where inequality is advantageous (third term). The second and third terms which capture respectively, envy and altruism, are normalized by the term n 1: Notice that in FS preferences, inequality is self-centered, i.e., the individual uses her own utility as a reference point with which everyone else is compared. > 1 would imply that an individual could increase utility by simply destroying all his/her wealth; this is counterfactual. The restriction < is based on experimental evidence. These and related issues are more fully discussed in Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
Sequence of moves
We consider a two-stage game. In the …rst stage, all voters vote directly and sincerely on the redistributive tax rate. Should a median voter equilibrium exist, then the tax rate preferred by the median voter is implemented. In the second stage, all voters make their labour supply decision, conditional on the tax rate chosen by the median voter in the …rst stage. On choosing their labour supplies in the second stage, the announced …rst period tax rate is implemented and transfers made according to (2.5) .
In the second stage the voters play a one-shot Nash game: each voter, j, chooses his/her labour supply, l j , given the vector, l j , of labour supplies of the other voters, so as to maximize his/her FS-utility (2.11). In the …rst stage, each voter votes for his/her preferred tax rate, correctly anticipating the second stage play.
The solution is by backward induction. We …rst solve for the Nash equilibrium in labour supply decisions of voters conditional on the announced tax rates and transfers. The second stage decision is then fed into the …rst stage FS-utilities to arrive at the indirect utilities of voters, which are purely in terms of the tax rate. Voters then choose their most desired tax rates which maximize their indirect FS-utilities, with the proposal of the median voter being the one that is implemented.
Labour supply decision of taxpayers (second stage problem)
Given the tax rate, t, and the transfer, b, both determined in the …rst stage, the voters play a one-shot Nash game (in the subgame determined by t and b). Each voter, j, chooses own labour supply, l j , so as to maximize his/her FS-utility (2.11), given the labour supplies, l j , of all other voters.
Proposition 1 : In the second stage of the game, voter j, whether fair or sel…sh, chooses own labour supply, l j , so as to maximize own-utility, u (l j ; t; b; s j ), given t, b and s j .
We list, in Lemmas 1 and 2 below, some useful results.
Lemma 1 (Properties of labour supply): (a) Given t; b and s j , there is a unique labour supply for voter j, l j = l (t; b; s j ), that maximizes own-utility u (l j ; t; b; s j ), Substituting labour supply, given by Lemma 1(a), in u (l j ; t; b; s j ) we get the indirect own-utility function of voter j:
(2.14) 
Substituting labour supply, l (t; b; s j ), into (2.3) gives before-tax income:
Substituting b (t; s), given by Lemma 1 (g), into the indirect own-utility (2.14), gives
Existence of most desired tax rates (…rst stage)
Substituting labour supply, l (t; b; s j ), into the utility function, U j (l j ; l j ; t; b; s), and using (2.11) and (2.14), gives the indirect utility function, V j (t; b; ; ; s), of voter j
where v j is de…ned in (2.14).
In the light of Lemmas 2(bi) and 2(bii), (2.17) becomes
equivalently, 
where w j is de…ned in (2.16). Equivalently,
Since e u(c i ; 1 l i ) is continuous by assumption, and since l (t; b; s i ) and b (t; s) are continuous, by Lemma 1(e) and (g), it follows, from (2.10), (2.14), (2.16) where the weights on the individuals are de…ned by:
Finding a tax rate to maximize (2.23) is a completely standard problem in public economics.
Existence of a Condorcet winner
We shall show that a majority chooses the tax rate, t m , that is optimal for the median-skill voter, in the sense that, for each j 6 = m, a majority prefers t m over t j . We do this by using the single-crossing property of Gans and Smart (1996) .
De…nition 1 : (Gans and Smart, 1996) The 'single-crossing' property holds if for tax rates t; T and voters j; J, t < T , j < J, W j (t; ; ; s) > W j (T; ; ; s) ) W J (t; ; ; s) > W J (T; ; ; s).
4
Lemma 3 : (Gans and Smart, 1996) The 'single-crossing'property holds if
is an increasing function of j (where V j is de…ned in (2.18)). , 1996 ) If the 'single-crossing' property holds, then the median-voter is decisive, i.e., a majority chooses the tax rate that is optimal for the median-voter.
Lemma 4 : (Gans and Smart
The proofs of Lemmas 3, 4 can be found in Gans and Smart (1996) . 4 Here we use "<" to denote the usual ordering of real numbers. In the more general setting of Gans and Smart (1996) , "<" is used to denote several (possibly di¤erent) abstract orderings. In particular, a literal translation of Gants and Smart (1996) gives: T < t, j < J, W j (t; ; ; s) > W j (T; ; ; s) ) W J (t; ; ; s) > W J (T; ; ; s), where "j < J " has the usual meaning "j is less than J " but "T < t " means "t is less than T ".
Main results
We now introduce two further assumptions, A1 and A2, followed by the main result of the paper. < 0 can be interpreted as saying that an extra 1% on the redistributive tax rate hurts a poor person less than a rich person. Thus Assumption A1 roughly says that redistributive taxes hurt the poor less than the rich. This is the basic foundation of the modern welfare state, and as we show below, satis…ed in the important case of quasilinear preferences with constant labor supply, which is widely used in the literature.
A2:
@V j @t (t; b; ; ; s) 0.
Since @v @t
< 0, for t < 1 (Lemma 2(cii)), an increase in tax (bene…t, b, remaining …xed), is undesirable for a sel…sh-voter which is, of course, entirely reasonable. Assumption A2 extends this to fair-voters as well. It implies that envy/altruism is not so great as to make a fair-voter prefer an increase in tax, even if it has no gain for any one at all in terms of an increase in the bene…ts, b ( b is held …xed in computing
Proposition 3 : Under assumptions A1 and A2 a majority prefers the tax rate that is optimal for the median-skill voter.
Corollary 1 : Under assumption A1, if utility is quasi-linear, then a majority prefers the tax rate that is optimal for the median-voter. In particular, assumption A2 is not needed in this case.
Corollary 2 : Under assumption A1, if voters are sel…sh ( = = 0), then a majority prefers the tax rate that is optimal for the median-voter. Assumption A2 is satis…ed in this case.
As noted in the introduction, when labor supply is endogenous, the median-voter theorem with sel…sh voters is known to hold only in special cases. Corollary 2 establishes the existence of a Condorcet winner for a more general class of utility functions as compared to the existing literature.
4. An example: Quasi-linear preferences and constant elasticity of labor supply
We assume that the own-utility function is quasi-linear, with constant elasticity of labour supply, which is the most commonly used functional form in various applications of the median voter theorems.
where is the constant elasticity of labour supply, and satis…es
2)
The case = 1 has special signi…cance in the literature. In this case,
Meltzer and Richard (1981) use (4.3) to derive the celebrated result that the extent of redistribution varies directly with the ratio of the mean to median income. Piketty (1995) restricts preferences to the quasi-linear case with disutility of labour given by the quadratic form, (4.3).
It is straightforward to check that (4.1) satis…es (2.8) and (2.9). Substituting c j = (1 t) s j l j + b in (4.1), the own-utility function of voter j, we get
which corresponds to (2.10) above. Lemma 1 gives labour supply for voter j,
Substituting labour supply, l (t; b; s j ), given by (4.5), into (2.3), (2.5) and (4.4) gives, respectively, before-tax income,
the transfer to each voter,
and the indirect own-utility function of voter j:
and
From (4.10) we see that assumption A1 holds. From Corollary 1, assumption A2 is not needed to demonstrate the existence of a Condorcet winner for the quasi-linear case. Hence, it follows that a majority prefers the tax rate that is optimal for the median-voter. Thus, our assumptions (2.8), (2.9), and A1 are satis…ed by the example of quasi-linear preferences and constant elasticity of labour supply. Hence, they are satis…able in an important special case.
Conclusions
We replace the self-interested voters in the Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard (RRMR) framework with voters who have a preference for fairness, as in Fehr-Schmidt (1999) . We show that a Condorcet exists under plausible conditions. We believe that our contribution can open the way for further applications of behavioral concerns for fairness in political economy models. We also give a more general condition for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have purely sel…sh preferences.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider voter j. Let l j be the vector of labour supplies of all other voters. Hence u (l i ; t; b; s i ) ; i 6 = j; are …xed numbers. Since u (l j ; t; b; s j ) is continuous in l j , and since max f0; xg is continuous in x, it follows that U j (l j ; l j ; t; b; s), as as given by (2.11) , is a continuous function of l j 2 [0; 1]. Hence, U j (l j ; l j ; t; b; s) attains a maximum at some l j 2 [0; 1]. We shall argue that l j must maximize own-utility, u (l j ; t; b; s j ). Let A j = fi : i 6 = j and u (l i ; t; b; s i ) u (l j ; t; b; s j )g ,
Then U j (l j ; l j ; t; b; s) can be written as
In particular,
Suppose l j does not maximize own-utility u (l j ; t; b; s j ). Then we can …nd an l j , su¢ ciently close to l j , so that u l j ; t; b; s j > u l j ; t; b; s j and the sets A j and D j are unchanged. Then
Hence, U j l j ; l j ; t; b; s > U j l j ; l j ; t; b; s , which cannot be, since l j maximizes U j l j ; l j ; t; b; s .
Proof of Lemma 1: Given t; b and s i , u (l i ; t; b; s i ) is a continuous function of l i on the non-empty compact set [0; 1]. Hence, a maximum exists. Since e u is thrice di¤erentiable, so is u and, from (2.10), we get @u 
First, consider the case t = 1. From (2.10), u (l i ; 1; b; s i ) = e u (b; 1 l i ). From (2.8b), e u (b; 1 l i ) is a strictly decreasing function of l i on (0; 1]. By continuity, e u (b; 1 l i ) must be a strictly decreasing function of l i on [0; 1]. Hence, the optimum must be
Now suppose t 2 [0; 1). From (2.1), (2.8a), (2.8c) and (6.1) we get:
and, using (2.8d),
Hence, a maximum is an interior point, i.e.,
From (6.7) and (6.5) it follows that
Hence, the maximum is unique and is given by @u @l i (l i ; t; b; s i ) = 0. (6.8)
Since, from (2.8c), e u 2 (b; 0) = 0, it follows, from (6.1) and (6.6), that (6.8) also holds for t = 1. Hence, for any voter i, the labor supply,
can be found by solving (6.8).
Since u is thrice continuously di¤erentiable it follows, from (2.10) and (6.8) that l (t; b; s i ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable. If t = 1 then, from (6.6), @l i @b = 0. Now suppose t < 1. From (6.5),
Hence, from (6.4) and the implicit function theorem (or di¤erentiating the identity (6.8)), we get From Lemma 3 and (6.23) we get that 'single-crossing' holds. Hence, from Lemma 4, the median-voter is decisive, i.e., a majority chooses the tax rate that is optimal for the median-voter. This establishes Proposition 3. Proof of Corollary 1: Note that if u is quasi-linear, then u(c; 1 l) = c f (l). Hence, U (l; t; b; s) = (1 t) sl+b f (l). By the envelope theorem (or direct calculation), 
